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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
WILLIAM RAYMOND WALLACE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20021021-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a restitution award included in a sentence for aggravated 
kidnapping, a first degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to the pour-over 
provisions of Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 2003). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court properly order defendant to pay restitution for Amy 
Tavey's murder where defendant stated at sentencing that he "fe[lt] 
responsible for her dying"? 
This Court "will not disturb a trial court's restitution order unless it exceeds that 
prescribed by law or [the court] otherwise abused its discretion." State v. Bickley, 2002 
UT App 342, f 5 (internal citations omitted). This Court "review[s] a trial court's 
interpretation of restitution statutes for correctness." Id. 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 2002), relevant to this appeal, is attached at 
Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with aggravated robbery and aggravated 
kidnapping (R. 2-5). Notice was given with both charges that defendant was subject to 
enhanced penalties because defendant used a dangerous weapon in committing the crimes 
and he committed the crimes in concert with two or more persons. (R. 2-5). After a 
three-day trial, defendant was convicted of aggravated kidnapping (R. 106). The jury also 
found that, in committing the aggravated kidnapping, defendant did not use a firearm but * 
did act in concert with two or more persons (R. 107-08). Defendant was acquitted of 
aggravated robbery (R. 109). 
Defendant's presentence investigation report (PSI) recommended that defendant 
pay restitution both for the items taken during the robbery of the kidnapping victim, Keith 
Williams, and for funeral and other costs related to the murder of Williams's girlfriend, 
Amy Tavey, which occurred during the same criminal episode in which Williams was 
kidnapped (PSI at 4-5, 16; Supp. Memorandum at R. 166-69). Defense counsel objected 
to restitution either for the robbery, for which he was not convicted, or for the murder, for 
which he was not charged (R. 214:5-6, 13). However, in his own statement to the court, 
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defendant stated of Tavey's murder: "I never said to nobody that I wasn't there I 
feel responsible for her dying" (R. 214:13-14). 
The trial court sentenced defendant to a prison term of fifteen-years-to-life (R. 
176-77; R. 214:15). The trial court then ordered that defendant pay restitution, jointly and 
severally with the others responsible, for Amy Tavey's murder (R. 176-77; R. 215:15-16). 
The court did not order that defendant pay restitution to Keith Williams for the items 
taken from him during the kidnapping (R. 176-77; R. 214:15-16). 
Defendant timely appealed (R. 179-80). The supreme court transferred the 
matter to this Court for disposition (R. 210). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Late in the evening on May 3, 2002, defendant and several of his friends lured 
Keith Williams to their apartment, and, after beating him up, bound him with duct tape 
and forced him into the trunk of his car while they threatened to kill him (R. 215:167-69, 
174, 176-77, 179, 204; R. 216: 232, 235, 240, 244, 246, 376, 387-88, 393-95, 400-01; R. 
217:454-56, 462, 467-68). With Williams in the trunk, defendant and two of his friends 
drove off in Williams's car (R.215:185; R. 216:402, 405; R. 217:466). They were 
accompanied by another car containing more of defendant's friends, as well as Williams's 
girlfriend, Amy Tavey (R. 215:184-85, 186; R. 217:470). 
A short while later, when the cars stopped to drop one of the friends off at a 
house near the Jordan River, defendant and his friends realized that Williams was no 
longer in the trunk (R. 216:247, 403). The next day, the body of Amy Tavey was found 
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in the Jordan River; Amy had been shot to death (R. 216:266, 277). That same day, 
defendant was heard saying, "We killed somebody last night" (R. 216:309). 
Defendant and two other friends then fled to Las Vegas, Nevada (R. 216:339-41; 
R. 217:476-78, 481-83). When they were arrested a short while later, a gun matching that 
used to kill Amy Tavey was found with them (R. 216:283, 340, 352, 354, 358-61). 
At his sentencing, defendant told the court: "I never said to nobody that I wasn't 
there, I never said what happened didn't happen. I feel responsible for her dying. Do you 
know what I mean? I am not lying about that. I know there are some things that I could 
have did" (R. 214:13). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay restitution for 
Amy Tavey's death because he was neither charged with nor convicted of that crime, and 
because his counsel objected to such restitution at defendant's sentencing hearing. 
However, under the restitution statute, a trial court can order a defendant to pay restitution 
for any criminal conduct for which he admits responsibility at sentencing, whether or not 
he also admits criminal liability for the conduct. In this case, defendant admitted at 
sentencing that "I feel responsible for [Amy Tavey] dying." Given that admission, the 
trial court properly ordered defendant to pay restitution for Amy Tavey's murder. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ORDERED DEFENDANT TO 
PAY RESTITUTION FOR AMY TAVEY'S MURDER WHERE 
DEFENDANT STATED AT SENTENCING THAT HE "FE[LT] 
RESPONSIBLE FOR HER DYING" 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay restitution for 
the murder of Amy Tavey because "he was never charged nor convicted of any crime 
relating to the murder victim's death and . . . he didn't agree to pay said restitution but 
rather contested its entry at the time of sentencing." Aplt. Br. at 33. Defendant's claim 
fails under the plain language of the restitution statute. 
This Court's "primary goal in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the 
legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain language, in light of the purpose the statute 
was meant to achieve." State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, \ 25, 4 P.3d 795. In doing so, this 
Court "assume[s] that 'each term in the statute was used advisedly.'" Stephens v. 
Bonneville Travel, Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 520 (Utah 1997) (citations omitted. In addition, 
"statutory term[s] should be interpreted and applied according to [their] usually accepted 
meaning, where the ordinary meaning of the term[s] results in an application that is 
neither unreasonably confused, inoperable, nor in blatant contradiction of the express 
purpose of the statute." State v. Coonce, 2001 UT App 355, % 9, 36 P.3d 533 (citations 
omitted). Finally, this Court "'avoid[s] interpretations that will render portions of a 
statute superfluous or inoperative.'" State v. Tooele County, 2002 UT 8, % 10, 44 P.3d 680 
(citation omitted); see also State v. McKinnon, 2002 UT App 214, % 6 n.4, 51 P.3d 729. 
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Utah's restitution statute, section 76-3-201 of the Utah Code, provides: 
When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has 
resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it 
may impose, the court shall order that the defendant make 
restitution to the victims, or for conduct for which the defendant 
has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(a) (Supp. 2002). A "victim" is defined as "any person," 
other than a co-participant, "who the court determines has suffered pecuniary damages as 
a result of the defendant's criminal activities." Id. § 76-3-20 l(l)(e)(ii). 
"Criminal activities" is defined as "any offense of which the defendant is 
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to 
the sentencing court with or without an admission of committing the criminal conduct." 
Id. § 76-3-201(l)(b). 
Defendant does not challenge the meaning of subsections (4)(a) or (l)(e)(i) of the 
restitution statute. See Aplt. Br. at 33-36. Rather, he challenges whether restitution for 
Amy Tavey's murder was appropriate under subsection (l)(b). See id. 
As defendant notes in his brief, defendant was neither charged with nor 
convicted of Amy Tavey's murder. See Aplt. Br. at 35. Thus, restitution for Amy's 
murder was proper only if the murder was "criminal conduct for which the defendant 
admitted] responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of 
committing the criminal conduct." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(1 )(b). 
The plain meaning of "admit" in this context is "to concede as true or valid," "to 
make acknowledgment." Merriam-Webster Dictionary, at http://www.m-w.com/cgi-
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bin/dictionarv?book=Dictionarv&va=admit(last visited 12/30/2003); see also American 
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed. 2000), at 
http://www.bartlebv.com/61/37/A0093700.html (last visited 12/30/2003) (defining 
"admit" to include "[t]o grant to be real, valid, or true; acknowledge," "to make 
acknowledgment"). 
The plain meaning of "responsibility" is "the quality or state of being 
responsible," as in "moral, legal, or mental accountability," or "something for which one 
is responsible." Merriam-Webster Dictionary, at http://www.m-w.com/cgi-
bin/dictionarv?book=Dictionary&va=responsibilitv (last visited 12/30/2003); see also 
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed. 2000), at 
http://www.bartlebv.com/61/25/R0182500.html (last visited 12/30/2003) (defining 
"responsibility" as "[t]he state, quality, or fact of being responsible," "[sjomething for 
which one is responsible"). 
Applying these definitions to section 76-3-201(1 )(b), a person may be ordered to 
pay restitution whenever he concedes or acknowledges his accountability—criminal, 
moral, or otherwise—for criminal conduct which has caused another injury. 
The one case cited by defendant, State v. Watson, 1999 UT App 273, 987 P.2d 
1289, does not alter this conclusion. In Watson, the defendant was originally charged 
with criminal homicide, attempted criminal homicide, and obstruction of justice for 
allegedly driving co-defendants to and from the scene of the crime and then disposing of 
the car she used to drive them. 1999 UT App 273, ^  2. However, the defendant pleaded 
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guilty only to attempted obstruction of justice. Id. Moreover, her admissions at 
sentencing suggested at most only that she heard shots, saw people running to her car, and 
drove them away from the scene. 1999 UT App 273, f 4. Under those circumstances, 
this Court held it was error to order the defendant to pay restitution costs associated with 
the murder charge. 1999 UT App 273, H 5. 
In doing so, this Court noted that, to conclude that the defendant was responsible 
for the murder, "the trial court . . . made inferences about [the defendant's] state of mind 
based upon the evidence before it." Id. Such inferences were not proper where the 
restitution statute "does not ask the trial court to analyze a defendant's state of mind, but 
rather asks it to focus on admissions made to the sentencing court." Id. 
Thus, this Court held, the statute "requires that responsibility for the criminal 
conduct be firmly established, much like a guilty plea, before the court can order 
restitution." Id.; see also State v. Bickley, 2002 UT App 342, % 10, 60 P.3d 582 (rejecting 
State's claim that defendant agreed to pay all child support owed because "'[w]ithout 
making inferences as the trial court did, it cannot be said that [Defendant in this case] 
admitted responsibility for' restitution prior to 1997") (quoting Watson, 1999 UT App 
273, ^ 5) (second alteration in original); State v. Mast, 2001 UT App 402, ffi[ 17-18, 40 
P.3d 1143 (rejecting State's claim that defendant who pleaded guilty to receiving stolen 
property admitted responsibility for underlying burglary when she acknowledged to court 
"that her version of events was 'far-fetched'"; reiterating that, before defendant can be 
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ordered to pay restitution, her responsibility must be "'firmly established, much like a 
guilty plea'") (citation omitted). 
In the context of the plain language of section 76-3-201(1 )(b), the import of 
Watson, Bickley, and Mast is clear: If a defendant has not been convicted of the criminal 
conduct, he may only be ordered to pay restitution for it if he expressly acknowledges— 
i.e., firmly establishes—responsibility for that conduct at sentencing. See Bickley, 2002 
UT App 342, % 10; Mast, 2001 UT App 402, fflf 17-18; Watson, 1999 UT App 273, % 5. 
Because, as previously discussed, the restitution statute does not require actual admission 
of guilt, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(1 )(b), these cases reach no further.1 
Here, defendant told the trial court at sentencing, "I feel responsible for [Amy 
Tavey] dying" (R. 214:13-14). Thus, unlike in Bickley, Mast, or Watson, defendant here 
expressly admitted responsibility for the uncharged criminal conduct, in this case, Amy 
Tavey's murder. Under the restitution statute, then, defendant could properly be ordered 
to pay restitution for that murder. 
Still, defendant argues that restitution was improper because defendant's trial 
counsel objected to it at defendant's sentencing. See Aplt. Br. at 36. However, trial 
counsel's objection did nothing to detract from defendant's admission. See, e.g. State v. 
'Indeed, to hold otherwise, i.e., to hold that the defendant must actually admit 
criminal guilt, would render the latter part of the statute—"with or without an admission 
of committing the criminal conduct"—inoperable. This Court must "'avoid 
interpretations that will render portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative.'" Tooele 
County, 2002 UT 8, ^ 10 (citation omitted). 
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Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 937-38 (Utah 1998) (holding that defense counsel's statements at 
sentencing could not be attributed to defendant for purposes of determining restitution). 
Alternatively, defendant claims restitution was improper because, at sentencing, 
defendant "was adamantly maintaining his innocence to even the conviction relating to 
Williams in addition to anything associated with Tavey." Aplt. Br. at 36. As already 
discussed, however, the restitution statute focuses on a defendant's admission of 
responsibility—legal, moral, or otherwise,—for the criminal conduct, not on the 
defendant's admission of criminal liability for the conduct. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
201(l)(b) (providing defendant can be ordered to pay restitution "with or without an 
admission of committing the criminal conduct"). Thus, defendant's refusal to 
acknowledge his guilt is irrelevant to whether restitution was properly ordered in this 
case. 
Because defendant admitted responsibility for Amy's murder to the sentencing 
court, even though he did not admit actually committing that crime, the trial court did not 
err in ordering defendant to pay restitution for that crime. 
Consequently, defendant's claim fails. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's 
conviction and sentence, including the trial court's restitution order. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED £f_ January 2004. If 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
KAREN A. KLUCZNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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76-3-201. Definitions — Sentences or combination of sen-
tences allowed — Civil penalties — Hearing. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is 
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits 
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of 
committing the criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general 
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil 
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's 
criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken, 
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings 
and medical expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary 
damages to a victim, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity 
for extradition or transportation and as further defined in Title 77, 
Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act. 
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person who the court determines has suf-
fered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal 
activities. 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's 
criminal activities. 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a 
person convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or 
combination of them: 
fa) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
id) to imprisonment; 
(e) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or 
(f) to death. 
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law 
to: 
(i) forfeit property; 
(ii) dissolve a corporation; 
(iii) suspend or cancel a license; 
(iv) permit removal of a person from office; 
(v) cite for contempt; or 
(vi) impose any other civil penalty, 
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
(4) (a) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in 
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the 
court shall order that the defendant make restitution to the victims, or for 
conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of 
a plea agreement. 
(b) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall 
follow the criteria and procedures as provided in Title 77, Chapter 38a, 
Crime Victims Restitution Act. 
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court 
shall order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transporta-
tion expenses if the defendant was: 
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another 
within the state at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal 
charges; 
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and 
(iii) convicted of a crime. 
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of 
governmental transportation expenses if any of the following apply: 
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent 
failure to appear a warrant is issued for an infraction; or 
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order. 
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Sub-
section (5)(a)(i) shall be calculated according to the following schedule: 
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported; 
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; 
and 
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported. 
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to 
each defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants 
actually transported in a single trip. 
(d) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, 
Chapter 30, Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is 
convicted of criminal activity in the county to which he has been returned, 
the court may, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, order that 
the defendant make restitution for costs expended by any governmental 
entity for the extradition. 
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that 
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order 
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances in 
aggravation or mitigation of the crime. 
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a 
statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or 
presenting additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed 
with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to 
the time set for sentencing. 
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify impo-
sition of the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in 
the case, the probation officer's report, other reports, including reports 
received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation 
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence 
introduced at the sentencing hearing. 
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and 
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term. 
(e) In determining a just sentence, the court shall consider sentencing 
guidelines regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances promul-
gated by the Sentencing Commission. 
(7) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnapping, rape 
of a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a child, 
the defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and if the charge is 
set forth in the information or indictment and admitted by the defendant, or 
found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant shall be sentenced to the 
highest minimum term in state prison. This subsection takes precedence over 
any conflicting provision of law. 
